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Abstract 
Recent years have seen a surge in economic integration agreements (EIAs) and the 
development of non-tariff measures (NTMs). As a consequence, a growing number of EIAs 
include provisions on NTMs. This paper focuses on provisions on technical regulations. We 
investigate whether the technical requirements contained in North-South Agreements affect 
international trade. More particularly, using a gravity equation, we assess to what extent 
North-South harmonization of technical barriers creates or reinforces a hub-and-spoke trade 
structure potentially detrimental to the integration of Southern countries in world economy. 
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1. Introduction 
Two emerging features of the changing patterns of trade integration suggest that the impact of 
specific provisions included in Economic Integration Agreements (EIAs) should be 
reconsidered from a broader perspective than traditional trade diversion and creation. First, 
tariffs on goods have been extensively bound and reduced to an average below 5%, while 
technical, sanitary and regulatory measures at the border have spread. Second, it is often 
argued that progress is more easily achieved within EIAs when it comes to deep trade 
liberalization, the multilateral scene having become too heterogeneous to converge easily on 
ambitious and mutually beneficial liberalization agendas. These two trends reinforce each 
other: It is partly because the agenda of trade negotiations has shifted from tariffs to more 
complex issues that progress has become increasingly difficult in the multilateral arena; EIAs 
offer a more versatile negotiating environment.  
Seen this way, EIAs have become vehicles to open up ambitious negotiation agendas 
covering a wide range of border and behind-the-border measures, and whose trade impact can 
no longer be viewed through the traditional lens of trade creation and trade diversion. Non-
tariff measures and their harmonization, including (inter alia) product standards and sanitary 
and phytosanitary (SPS) measures, feature prominently in those agendas, albeit with varying 
degrees of success in terms of real achievements. 
As highlighted by Bourgeois et al. (2007), little attention has been given in the 
literature to the effect of standards liberalization in the context of EIAs. The existing literature 
(see, among others, Czubala et al., 2009; Moenius, 2004, Henry de Frahan and Vancauteren, 
2006) focuses on the trade effects of standards – often distinguishing between country-
specific and internationally-harmonized standards – but does not examine whether these 
effects interact with the presence of EIAs. 
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A first issue relating to the inclusion of standards provisions in EIAs concerns 
integration among high-income countries; namely, whether the mutual recognition of 
standards leads to different outcomes than their harmonization. Chen and Mattoo (2008) show 
that both standards harmonization and their mutual recognition (with or without rules of 
origin) raise significantly the probability and volume of intra-regional trade between 
developed countries. However, the effect is larger for mutual-recognition agreements, 
especially those without rules of origin, than for harmonization agreements.  
A second set of issues arises with North-South agreements. Here the tension between 
liberalizing trade and introducing new distortions is even greater. As technical regulations are 
typically more stringent in high-income countries, either de jure or de facto (through stricter 
enforcement), what is at stake in such EIAs is a convergence of standards to the more 
stringent Northern ones and their adoption by developing countries. There is an abundant 
literature on the standards divide (Wilson and Abiola, 2003) pointing to the potential 
detrimental effects of high-income countries’ standards on exports from developing 
economies (Otsuki et al., 2001). But how the adoption of Northern standards by Southern 
countries—when they manage to match them—affects trade patterns remains an open 
question. It is this question we address here. 
Notwithstanding the standard divide, compliance of the Southern partner with 
Northern standards in an EIA can confer indirect benefits by raising the quality of exported 
products and encouraging improved management and production processes (see Maertens and 
Swinnen, 2009, for an example in Senegalese agriculture). But this typically will come at a 
cost—even if that cost is sometimes reduced by technical-assistance programs such as the 
European Pesticides Initiative Program—and the higher cost and changed market positioning 
may price those exports out of other Southern markets. The Southern partner will then 
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redirect its exports to the Northern partner, a trade deflection that may hurt actual or potential 
South-South trade.  
How large is this trade deflection is an empirical question that depends, inter alia, on 
how specific and stringent the standards are. When the Northern partner’s standard is 
idiosyncratic (national or regional), the Southern partner’s adaptation to that particular 
standard may make it costlier to produce also for other markets with different standards, or at 
least may not help on those markets. For instance, adopting a standard imposed by the 
European Union (EU) does not necessarily facilitate clearance of the product in the United 
States (US). This effect may be mitigated when harmonization takes place on the basis of 
international standards. Although there is no theoretical argument establishing a cost 
hierarchy to standards, and regional standards are not necessarily costlier to implement that 
international ones, a number of papers (see e.g. Otsuki et al., 2001; Wilson and Otsuki, 2004) 
have shown empirically that international standards are less trade-inhibiting than domestic or 
regional ones, having a smaller negative trade impact and even, in some cases, a positive 
one.
1
   
The main objective of our paper is accordingly to assess whether the liberalization of 
technical barriers to trade (TBTs) in North-South EIAs contributes to reinforce hub-and-spoke 
trade patterns centered around large Northern blocs, potentially damaging for South-South 
trade integration. Put differently, the hypothesis is that, as a result of the deep integration 
associated with standards provisions included in the EIA, the Southern partners’ trade 
expands with the North, but at the expense of their trade with non-bloc Southern partners.  
Unlike classical trade diversion, the trade deflection we study in this paper has 
theoretically ambiguous welfare implications for two main reasons. First, to the extent that the 
                                                 
1 However, there are counterexamples where even international standards impose adaptation costs that stifle 
trade; for instance, Jensen and Keyser (2012) show how the adoption by the East African Community of dairy 
standards based on the international Codex Alimentarius led to requirements so tight that regional trade in dairy 
products was largely stifled. 
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Southern partner’s producers adapt their entire production processes to Northern standards, 
negative externalities on health or the environment may be reduced, with positive welfare 
effects. Such concerns are important for agricultural and food products, and we replicate our 
exercise for manufactured products in order to downplay this concern. Second, even 
abstracting from externality arguments, it is difficult to ascertain, without making additional 
assumptions, why the adoption of a Northern standard (say, a certain plug design) inducing 
trade deflection toward that market would necessarily be welfare-reducing for the Southern 
partner. Against this background, we will limit our analysis to trade patterns and refrain from 
drawing welfare implications. 
We use a standard theoretically founded gravity framework to investigate 
systematically how provisions on standards included in North-South EIAs impact 
international trade. This equation is estimated for trade in goods as a whole and for 
manufactured products only. The identification of classical trade-diversion effects in a gravity 
equation relies on changes in bilateral import patterns for trade bloc’s members (see e.g. 
Carrère, 2006). In contrast, our identification of deflection effects relies on changes in 
bilateral export flows between two Southern countries when one of them belongs to a North-
South trade bloc. Our conjecture therefore relies on a cost-raising effect rather than a tariff-
preference effect. 
Empirical results provide strong support to our conjecture. The existence of North-
South EIAs hurts South-South trade, and does so even more in the presence of standards 
harmonization. Moreover, contrary to expectations, harmonization on the basis of regional 
standards in North-South EIAs impacts negatively the exports of developing countries to the 
North. Taken together, both results suggest that standard harmonization provisions included 
in North-South EIAs hardly reinforces the export potential of Southern countries.  
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The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 surveys the literature in order 
to highlight our contribution. Section 3 describes the TBT provisions included in North-South 
EIAs. Section 4 presents our econometric specification and data. Results are discussed in 
section 5. We conclude in section 6. 
 
2. Literature review 
In an early contribution, Baldwin (2000) examined different routes towards standard 
liberalization and argued that mutual recognition among developed countries could well lead 
to a two-tier international trade system with developing countries in the second tier. Since 
then, the literature, mostly empirical, has developed along two strands. 
A first strand examines standards provisions in several EIAs and investigates whether 
they go beyond the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement on TBT. These papers do 
not quantify the trade impact of this regional liberalization. Covering 28 EIAs where the EU 
or the US is a partner, Horn et al. (2009) show that all except two US agreements include 
TBT provisions. Furthermore, for 5 EU and 11 US agreements, these provisions are legally 
enforceable, meaning that the agreement specifies clear legal obligations, which are thus more 
likely to be implemented.  
Piermartini and Budetta (2009) survey 58 EIAs with TBT provisions. They carefully 
analyze the legal text of these EIAS and scrutinize whether the TBT provisions refer to the 
WTO TBT agreement and whether regional liberalization of TBTs through harmonization or 
mutual recognition is pursued. They also examine transparency requirements, institutional and 
administrative frameworks, and co-operation between members on TBTs. Their study 
provides rich information. For instance, harmonization appears to be often used for standards 
and technical regulations, whereas mutual recognition is favored for conformity assessment 
procedures. Moreover, EIAs signed by the US promote mutual recognition of conformity 
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assessment procedures, whereas EIAs signed by the EU also often promote further 
harmonization of technical regulations. In view of this last observation, Piermartini and 
Budetta (2009) raise the issue of whether regional harmonization may not lock countries into 
EIAs, hampering multilateral trade liberalization, although they do not test their conjecture. 
Lesser (2007) extends Piermartini and Budetta (2009)’s mapping to 82 EIAs, with a special 
focus on Chile, Singapore and Morocco. 
A second strand of the literature seeks to quantify the trade effects of agreements 
covering standards and uncovers potentially damaging effects for developing countries, in 
accordance with Baldwin’s intuition. Chen and Mattoo (2008) examine regional standards 
liberalization through harmonization and mutual recognition agreements between industrial 
countries, controlling for the presence of rules of origin in the latter case. On the basis of a 
sample covering disaggregated manufacturing trade flows between 42 countries (28 OECD 
and 14 non-OECD countries) over 1986-2000, they find that harmonization fosters trade 
between member countries but reduces it with the rest of the world. Mutual recognition with 
rules of origin has a qualitatively similar effect, while mutual recognition without rules of 
origin raises trade both within and outside the bloc.  
Baller (2007) studies the trade impact on both member and non-member countries of 
TBT liberalization through mutual-recognition and harmonization agreements. Her analysis 
includes North-North, North-South and South-South agreements and uses a two-stage gravity 
estimation for two sectors: Telecom equipment and medical devices. She finds that mutual-
recognition agreements significantly raise the probability and volume of trade for member 
countries. Interestingly, third-party developed countries outside the bloc also benefit from 
harmonization, whereas third-party developing countries do not.  
Reyes (2011, 2012) provides a possible explanation for Baller’s result. Using detailed 
firm-level data, he shows that the harmonization of the EU’s electronics standards on 
 8
international ones in the 1990s induced entry by new US exporters, making the market more 
competitive and encouraging trade (in this case, with a Northern non-member). However, this 
change in market structure was accompanied by a retrenchment by Southern exporters on the 
EU markets, thus hurting trade with Southern non-members. It is difficult to ascertain the 
mechanism that induced this substitution, but one conjecture is that the EU market became 
tougher, inducing the exit of weaker Southern players. 
Note that the presence of standards arrangement does not necessarily flank EIAs. For 
instance, the EU and US have agreed to mutual recognition of pharmaceutical products 
without this being part of an FTA. The agreement’s objective is mutual recognition not only 
of technical standards but also of conformity-assessment procedures. Using a Tobit model 
over 1990-2004, Amurgo-Pacheco (2006) shows that the mutual recognition agreement 
harmed third-country exports, irrespective of their level of development.  
The bottom line of this literature review is that harmonization of standards has an 
impact on trade, and that it can be detrimental to third countries’ exports, in particular 
developing ones. However, our opening question, i.e. whether provisions on standards 
harmonization included in North-South trade agreement are detrimental or not to the 
integration of Southern countries in the world economy, remains an open issue.  
 
3. TBT provisions in North-South EIAs 
To what extent do harmonization clauses in North-South EIAs constrain the regulatory 
flexibility of Southern countries? There is no single answer to that question, as TBT 
harmonization clauses in EIAs vary widely in their intent and wording. Broadly speaking, 
there is a continuum of degrees of stringency, ranging from agreements where the Northern 
partner clearly expects the Southern one to align its domestic regulations, to others with rather 
loose cooperation clauses. This diversity suggests that Northern countries do not have “RTA 
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models” that they tend to negotiate with all their Southern partners. Even EU negotiators, 
notwithstanding their clear view of what deep integration means, adjust their requests to local 
conditions. 
In cases where EIAs are part of broad-ranging partnerships, they can include strong 
suggestions that the Southern country should seek to harmonize all of its domestic product 
regulations on that partner’s own regulations and build the necessary institutions. For 
instance, Article 51 of the European Community (EC)-Morocco EIA states that: 
“[t]he Parties shall cooperate in developing: (a) the use of Community rules in 
standardisation, metrology, quality control and conformity assessment; (b) the 
updating of Moroccan laboratories, leading eventually to the conclusion of mutual 
recognition agreements for conformity assessment; (c) the bodies responsible for 
intellectual, industrial and commercial property and for standardisation and quality in 
Morocco.” 
Article 51 of the EC-Tunisia EIA is identical. Article 40 of the EC-Palestinian 
Authority EIA contains a harmonization clause worded in similar language: “The objective of 
cooperation will be to narrow the gap in standards and certification. In practical terms 
cooperation will take the form of the promotion of the use of Community technical 
regulations and European standards and conformity assessment procedures.” In such cases, it 
seems to be the intention of EU negotiators to encourage partners to adopt EC regulations 
even for products aimed at the domestic or other, non-EU export markets. 
EU trade agreements with countries with which it has less ambitious cooperation 
agendas contain less stringent clauses on TBTs, although sometimes one can detect a whiff of 
the same intention. For instance, Article 18 of the EC-Chile agreement states that 
“[c]ooperation between the Parties will seek to promote efforts in (a) regulatory cooperation; 
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(b) compatibility of technical regulations on the basis of international and European 
standards” [italics added].  
Neither the EC-Mexico nor the EC-Egypt agreements contain any suggestion of that 
type. Instead, harmonization is expected to take place on the basis of international standards. 
For instance, Article 19 of the EC-Mexico merely states that the Parties “shall work towards: 
[…] (c) promoting the use of international standards, technical regulations and conformity 
assessment procedures on the basis of international agreements; (d) facilitating the adoption 
of their respective standards, technical regulations and conformity assessment procedures on 
the basis of international requirements.” Similar clauses can be found in other North-South 
agreements. For instance, Article 705 of the Australia-Thailand EIA states that “[t]he Parties 
shall, where appropriate, endeavor to work towards harmonization of their respective 
technical regulations, taking into account relevant international standards, recommendations 
and guidelines, in accordance with their international rights and obligations.” However, there 
is a nuance in the scope of harmonization. In the latter case (Australia-Thailand), Chapter 7, 
to which Article 705 belongs, applies to “all goods traded between the parties”, implying that 
goods not traded bilaterally could potentially remain uncovered; whereas no such scope 
limitation can be found in the EC-Mexico clause on harmonization. Therefore, if one accepts 
the idea that, even when the letter of the agreement does not prescribe convergence on the 
Northern standard, de facto this is what is likely to happen, the EC-Mexico harmonization 
clause can be taken as more encompassing than the Australia-Thailand one which leaves 
regulations that are irrelevant to bilateral trade outside of the agreement’s scope. Similar 
scope limitations can be found e.g. in Article 7.2 of the US-CAFTA (Dominican Republic – 
Central America) agreement and in Article 7.1 of the US-Bahrain agreement. 
Whether or not Southern alignment on Northern regulations is explicitly called for in 
the text of the agreement, we will assume in the rest of this paper that the ability of Southern 
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producers to freely choose their technical specifications is always constrained, one way or 
another, by the existence of a TBT harmonization clause in a North-South EIA. When the 
harmonization of domestic regulations is not explicitly called for, the argument is essentially 
one about production lines—that once the Southern-based producer has been forced to adapt 
its production processes to Northern regulations for products bound for that market, it is likely 
to adopt the same processes for all of its production in order to avoid unnecessary 
complications. When those processes are costlier on account of stringent Northern 
regulations, one can expect the Southern country’s trade flows to be affected with all partners. 
This is what we test. 
 
4. Econometric specification and data 
4.1 Econometric specification 
In this section we tackle the impact of TBT provisions in North-South EIAs on Southern 
countries’ trade. What we aim at identifying is the deviation from “normal” bilateral trade 
patterns of countries having signed such agreements. This question has two separate 
components. First what is the impact on North-South trade, meaning the impact on trade with 
the signatory Northern country? Second what is the impact on trade with other Southern 
countries?  
The gravity equation provides an appropriate framework for such analysis. As is well-
known, it can be seen as a reduced form of the theoretical trade flow prediction based on the 
combination of the importer’s budget allocation and a market-clearing condition for the 
exporter. Our theoretical foundation for trade patterns is the standard monopolistic 
competition-CES demand-Iceberg trade costs model first introduced by Krugman (1980) and 
used by many since then.
2
 Producers operating under increasing returns in each country 
                                                 
2 Alternative theoretical foundations of the gravity equations include very different assumptions: perfect 
competition with technology differences as in Eaton and Kortum (2002), monopolistic competition with different 
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produce differentiated varieties that they ship, at a cost, to consumers in all countries. 
Following Redding and Venables (2004), the total value xijt of exports from country i to 
country j in year t can be written as follows:  
                           (1)                       )(
111  
jtjtijtititijt
PYTpnx  
with nit and pit the number of varieties and prices in country i in year t, Yjt, and Pjt being the 
expenditure and price index of country j in year t. Tijt represents the iceberg transport costs in 
year t. 
The simplest way to estimate (1) is to use ordinary least squares (OLS). However, this 
approach excludes zero-value observations from the estimation. One way to deal with zero 
flows consists in using a two-stage estimation procedure. The decision to export is estimated 
in the first stage, while the second stage focuses on the value of exports. The Heckman model 
is often used in the trade literature. However, in the presence of fixed effects in the first-stage, 
the Heckman model leads to the incidental parameter problem. Helpman et al. (2008) also 
develop a two-stage estimation procedure which accounts for both the extensive (decision to 
export from i to j) and the intensive (volume of exports conditional on exporting) margins of 
trade. While this approach offers a better understanding of the determinants of trade flows, it 
provides biased estimates in the presence of heteroskedasticity in trade data (Santos Silva and 
Tenreyro, 2009). The RESET test (Ramsey, 1969) performed on our data suggests the 
presence of heteroskedasticity in our sample. Therefore to avoid biased estimation results, we 
use the Poisson estimator suggested by Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006). The Poisson 
estimator provides estimates that are comparable to elasticity estimates from the standard 
linear-in-logs specification and corrects for heteroskedasticity in the error term. The 
performance of the Poisson estimator has been challenged in the literature on the ground that 
                                                                                                                                                        
functional forms as in Melitz and Ottaviano (2008), or heterogeneous firms operating in a Dixit–Stiglitz 
environment as in Chaney (2008). All of those however yield a strictly equivalent estimable specification for our 
purpose. 
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Santos Silva and Tenreyro’s 2006 paper was not considering the case where the dependent 
variable has a substantial proportion of zero values. However, Santos Silva and Tenreyro 
(2011) show that even in the presence of many zeroes, the Poisson estimator is well behaved. 
In addition, our data are aggregated, which reduces the proportion of zeroes in our sample.  
While 
1
itit
pn and 
1
jttj
PY  are not totally disconnected from the two GDPs of i and 
j respectively, they are crude approximations at best, raising issues on the validity of simple 
gravity specifications and results. A specification more consistent with theory involves the 
use of fixed effects for each importer and exporter and year (Baldwin and Taglioni, 2006; 
Feenstra, 2004). The fixed effects incorporate size effects as in gravity, but also the other 
origin and destination determinants seen above, the price and the number of varieties of the 
exporting country, and the demand size and price index (often referred to as a remoteness 
term) of the importing country. Our specification includes country and year fixed effects. We 
also control for the potential endogeneity of EIAs by using country-pair fixed effects 
(Anderson and Yotov, 2011; Baier and Bergstrand, 2007). Another source of bias could be the 
potential dependence between some EIAs. However, as shown in section 3, there is a great 
diversity in the TBT harmonization clauses included in EIAs, suggesting that Northern 
countries (the EU, the US, etc.) do not negotiate the same provisions on standards 
harmonization with all their Southern partners. Therefore, this potential bias is not likely to be 
at play in our analysis. Lastly, in all regressions, the correlation of errors across years for a 
same country-pair is taken into account by appropriate clustering at the country-pair level.  
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4.2 Data  
Trade data come from the BACI database developed by the CEPII.
3
 Our dependent variable is 
the total bilateral imports of country j from country i in year t ( ijtx ). Note that in BACI flows 
are reconciled and that such value is equal to exports from i to j in t. In BACI, values are 
FOB. We cover the period from 1990 to 2006 (except for some newly independent countries 
in Central Asia or Africa). To avoid the potential bias associated with fixed effects 
estimations on data pooled over consecutive years (Anderson and Yotov, 2011), we use only 
the years 1991, 1994, 1997, 2000, 2003 and 2006.  
Transport costs are measured using the bilateral distance between both partners (dij). 
These distances are extracted from the CEPII database.
4
 In addition, we include a dummy 
variable for contiguity (cbordij) that equals one if both countries share a border. Bilateral trade 
can also be fostered by countries’ cultural proximity. We therefore control for this proximity 
by introducing two dummies, respectively equal to one if a language is spoken by at least nine 
percent of the population in both countries (clangij) or if both partners have had a colonial 
relationship (colonyij). Data come from the above-mentioned CEPII database. 
Our focus in this paper is on the trade effect of standards harmonization included in 
North-South EIAs on Southern countries’ trade. This leads us to consider both North-South 
and South-South trade. Accordingly, we split our sample of relations between all i and all j 
into two sub-samples corresponding respectively to North-South and South-South trade 
relations.
5
 North-North relations are dropped. The list of Northern and Southern countries is 
given in Appendix A. 
                                                 
3 http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/baci.htm. This database uses original procedures to harmonize the United 
Nations COMTRADE data (evaluation of the quality of country declarations to average mirror flows, evaluation 
of cost, insurance and freight rates to reconcile import and export declarations). 
4 http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/distances.htm. These distances are calculated as the sum of the distances 
between the biggest cities of both countries, weighted by the share of the population living in each city (Mayer 
and Zignago, 2011). 
5 In addition, a Chow test suggests that estimated coefficients on both sub-samples differ significantly and 
confirms this divide. 
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The last step is to specify the variables used to quantify the effect on North-South and 
South-South trade of incorporating provisions on standards harmonization in a North-South 
EIA. The full list of North-South EIAs considered in our exercise is provided in Appendix B. 
We cover 43 EIAs. We use the template provided by Piermartini and Budetta (2009) and 
update it by adding some recent North-South EIAs they did not review. For each EIA, we 
focus on provisions on technical regulations. According to the WTO definition, compliance 
with a technical regulation is mandatory. To build their template, Piermartini and Budetta 
(2009) focus on the legal text of the Agreements
6
 and scrutinize the wording. Expressions 
inviting parties to ‘bridge the gap’, ‘reduce divergence’ or ‘make compatible’ their standards 
and technical regulations indicate that the policy adopted is harmonization. Importantly, we 
must disentangle the impact of the North-South EIA as such from the inclusion of provisions 
on technical regulations in it. That is, we have a “treatment” that can take on different 
intensities and forms: just EIA, EIA with standards harmonization, EIA with harmonization 
on regional or international standards (see figure 1).  
Figure 1 about here 
We accordingly introduce a full set of dummies defined as follows: 
North-South trade relations:  
Basic treatment: 
- We define a “North-South EIA” dummy taking the value of 1 when i and j are 
members of a common regional North-South agreement (0 otherwise).  
Treatment intensity/form:  
- We first control whether the common North-South EIA includes a TBT provision 
involving harmonization of technical regulations. 
                                                 
6 The database on EIAs maintained by Baier and Bergstrand (http://www.nd.edu/~jbergstr/) also provides 
detailed and useful information on EIAs and links to the legal text of the Agreements. 
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- We then investigate whether, in addition to the harmonization, the common North-
South EIA promotes the use of some regional and/or international standards. Two 
dummies are built: a first dummy takes the value 1 if the EIA promotes the use of 
regional standards (0 otherwise); the second dummy is set to one if the EIA 
promotes the use of international standards (0 otherwise). 
The different treatments (presence of an EIA, harmonization of standards, and 
promotion of specific standards) are included consecutively in the estimations. Indeed, the 
harmonization of standards is conditional to the presence of an EIA and the promotion of 
specific standards is conditional to the presence of an EIA and to the harmonization of 
standards.  
 
South-South trade relations:  
Basic treatment: We control whether either the importing and/or the exporting countries have 
signed an EIA with a country in the North. This control allows us to test for trade diversion.  
Treatment intensity/form: 
- We control whether the EIA signed by the Southern partner (the importing or/and 
exporting country in the South-South trade relation) with the North involves 
standards harmonization. 
As for North-South estimations, the different treatments are included separately in the 
estimations. 
Lastly, for South-South trade, we also control for the existence of a South-South EIA 
between trading partners by including a “South-South EIA” dummy set to 1 if i and j are 
members of a common regional South-South agreement (0 otherwise).  
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Our estimated equation is therefore as follows: 
(2)      )colonyclangcbordlnfefefefeexp( 54321 ijtijtijijijijijjittjjiiijt dx  EIAs
 
where ijtx  is the dollar value of country j’s imports from country i in year t, fei and fej are the 
importer and exporter fixed effects, fet the time fixed effects, and feij the country-pair fixed 
effects. 
ij
d  is the bilateral distance, cbordij, clangij and colonyij are dummies to control for 
common border, common language and past colonial links. EIAsijt is the vector of dummies 
accounting for the presence of EIAs and for the provisions on standards harmonization included 
in these EIAs. The vector δ5 represents the estimated coefficients on these variables. Our 
estimations pick up the “average treatment” effects (and not the general equilibrium effects). 
)exp(uijtijt  , with uijt the error term. 
Before turning to the estimation results, we briefly report some statistics showing the 
expansion of North-South EIAs over the period 1990-2006. Table 1 provides the number of 
North-South EIAs and the share of Northern imports from the South covered by these EIAs in 
1990, 1999 and 2006. The number of EIAs expanded from 4 in 1990 to 43 in 2006. The share 
of Northern imports from the South covered by an EIA reached 19.5% in 2006. Furthermore, 
an increasing number of EIAs include TBT provisions involving the harmonization of 
technical regulations (21 North-South EIAs in 2006). A few numbers of EIAs promote the use 
of regional standards only (6 in 2006) and the trade coverage of these EIAs is about 3.8%. 
Lastly, one may note that the trade coverage of EIAs promoting the use of international 
standards (alone or in addition to regional standards) is decreasing between 1999 and 2006. 
 
Table 1 about here 
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5. Results 
We now present the results. As emphasized above, we expect different impacts of standards 
harmonization within North-South EIAs on South-North trade and South-South trade. 
Accordingly, we will first focus on North-South trade and then discuss the results for South-
South trade.  
 
5.1 North-South trade  
Table 2 presents an overview of the results for North-South trade. It focuses on the imports of 
the North from the South.  
The first column of Table 2 simply examines the mean impact of an EIA between a 
Northern and a Southern country on their bilateral trade. The main issue here is the necessary 
control for unobserved relative prices when it comes to explaining bilateral trade. Baldwin 
and Taglioni (2006) refer to this as the “the gold medal of classic gravity model mistakes”, 
namely the fact that the bilateral trade costs used as regressors in the estimated equation are 
correlated with the omitted variable since trade costs enter into these unobserved prices. To 
control for this issue, column (1) includes exporting country, importing country and year 
fixed effects. Baldwin and Taglioni (2006) show, however, that in the case of panel data, 
time-invariant country fixed effects are not sufficient to remove all the related bias: the cross-
section bias will be removed but not the time-series bias. To remove the latter, column (2) 
interacts our country fixed effects with year dummies. Column (2) also controls for the 
endogeneity of EIAs by including country-pair fixed effects (Baier and Bergstrand, 2007).  
The two partners can pursue deeper integration through the harmonization of their 
technical regulations, but this is not addressed in the first and second columns, as generally in 
the literature. The trade impact of such deeper integration is analyzed in column (3) whereby 
the presence of harmonization of standards is controlled for. Column (4) distinguishes 
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whether, in addition to harmonization, the EIA promotes the use of specific standards 
(regional vs. international standards).  
The overall fit of regressions is consistent with what is found in the literature. 
Regarding traditional covariates (column 1), distance negatively influences bilateral imports, 
while common border has a positive trade effect. If we focus on cultural proximity variables, 
we see that imports are higher if both countries share a language. The existence of a past 
colonial relationship has no significant influence. 
Regarding EIA variables, column (1) suggests that the existence of an EIA between 
the Northern importing country and the Southern exporting country increases their bilateral 
exchanges. An EIA raises trade by a factor of 1.36 (exp[0.31]), everything else held constant. 
Column (2) shows that the positive trade effect of EIAs is in fact largely due to an 
endogeneity bias. Once this bias is controlled for (by the inclusion of country-pair fixed 
effects), the estimated coefficient on EIAs becomes not significant. This result suggests that 
North-South EIAs are signed between countries that already traded a lot together. 
Column (3) highlights the trade effect of the harmonization of technical regulations 
between the two partners. Once we control for standards harmonization, the effects of trade 
preferences granted by developed countries to Southern partners through the EIA become 
negative. While the estimated coefficient is significant only at the 10 percent level and should 
therefore be taken with caution, a simple explanation arises. There is a redistribution of 
market shares between countries having engaged in standard harmonization and other 
exporters from the South, still preferred but having missed such move. The effect of standards 
harmonization is positive (p<0.10). Therefore, a deeper integration through standards 
harmonization seems to increase the expected trade benefit of the EIA. 
The EIA may define the standards to which partners shall harmonize. Column (4) 
suggests that harmonization to regional standards is trade-impeding, while harmonization to 
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international standards is trade-enhancing. These results show that the detrimental effect on 
North-South trade of harmonization contained in North-South EIAs is falling on 
harmonization of regional standards only. When harmonization authorizes the use of 
international standards, the negative impact on trade vanishes. Interestingly, the combined 
effect of the North-South EIA and the harmonization on international standards is positive, 
equal to 0.17 and significant at the 5 percent level. 
These results suggest that the cost linked to standards harmonization on a regional 
basis, i.e. the adoption by developing exporters of standards imposed on some developed 
markets is too high for some of these exporters, which are therefore excluded from the 
market. According to our results, the worst situation for a Southern country in terms of 
commerce with the North is the signature of a North-South EIA involving the harmonization 
of technical regulations and promoting the use of regional standards. Assuming a unit price 
elasticity of import demand, the ad valorem equivalent (AVE) is 29.7%.
7
 That is, the 
inhibiting trade effect of a North-South EIA promoting the use of regional standards is 
equivalent to a tariff at a whopping 29.7%. In such case, the positive effects of trade 
preferences granted by developed countries on account of the development policy are more 
than cancelled out.  
Lastly, columns (5) and (6) provide results of two robustness checks. We first restrict 
our sample to trade in manufactured products (column 5). Our focus in this paper is on the 
provisions on TBTs in EIAs. TBTs are with sanitary and phyosanitary measures the two main 
types of non-tariff measures. If sanitary and phytosanitary measures mainly affect agricultural 
products, TBTs are usually applied on manufactured goods. We therefore check whether our 
results are robust to the exclusion of agricultural trade flows from our sample. Results in 
                                                 
7 The ad valorem equivalent is exp(-β/ε)-1, where β is the estimated coefficient and ε the price elasticity of 
import demand (in algebraic form, ie negative). The average price elasticity of imports, over all goods and 
countries, is estimated by Kee et al. (2008) at -3.12 at HS6 and -1.1 at ISIC3. As we are dealing with aggregate 
flows here, the lower value estimated by Kee et al. at the more aggregate level (ISIC3) where substitution 
possibilities are reduced, is more plausible. 
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columns (4) and (5) are very similar, suggesting that the exclusion of agricultural products 
from our sample, which are less affected by TBTs, does not change our results. 
Our second robustness check deals with the lagged terms-of-trade effects of EIA and 
TBT harmonization. As shown by Baier and Bergstrand (2007), almost every trade 
agreements have a phase-in period and their trade effects could therefore not be totally 
captured in the concurrent year only. We therefore allow for gradual phasing-in of EIA and 
standard harmonization by including one lag for these variables in the estimation. Results are 
presented in column (6). We report the total trade effect by summing the value of the 
coefficients on the dummy for the concurrent year and on the lag. Standard errors are 
computed with the Delta method. This last estimation confirms our previous conclusions. 
Harmonization to regional standards is trade-impeding, while harmonization to international 
standards enhances trade.  
Table 2 about here 
 
5.2 South-South trade 
This section analyzes the influence of standards harmonization in North-South EIAs on 
bilateral trade between Southern countries. Results are reported in Table 3. Importing country, 
exporting country and year fixed effects are included in all regressions.  
 We first estimate the determinants of bilateral flows between Southern countries 
without controlling for the potential existence of EIAs between Southern countries and 
Northern partners (column 1). We then investigate the trade impact of North-South EIAs and 
standards harmonization on South-South trade (columns 2-5). Columns (2) and (4) test for 
potential diversion effects by investigating the impact on South-South trade of the signature 
by either the importing and/or the exporting Southern countries of an EIA with the North. 
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Columns (3) and (5) examine the additional trade impact linked to the harmonization of 
technical regulations.  
Traditional trade-diversion effects ay arise from the simple elimination of intra-bloc 
tariffs, especially if the Southern partner has high MFN tariffs. They will be reinforced in rare 
cases where the North-South agreement is a customs union (CU) causing the Southern 
country to raise its external tariff. The only example of a North-South CU in our database is 
Turkey with the EU.
 
With the exception of agricultural products, the low level of EU tariffs 
however guarantees that this effect has hardly played a role. As for the effect of agricultural 
products, our results are robust when limited to trade in manufactured products. Traditional 
trade-diversion effects would be picked up in our specification by dummy variables marking 
bilateral flows where the importer belongs to a NS EIA (“NS EIA for the importing country”, 
or “NS EIA for the importing country only”).  
By contrast, the trade-deflection effects we are exploring here would be picked up by 
dummy variables marking bilateral flows where the exporter belongs to a NS EIA with 
harmonization of standards, since it is the exporter who would suffer from additional 
production costs as a result of the harmonization. These dummies, which are included in 
specifications (3), (5) and (6), are labeled “NS EIA with standards harmonization with the 
North for the exporting country” (or for the exporting country only). 
In all estimations, distance has a negative and significant impact on trade flows, while 
common border, common language and past common colonizer increase trade (p<0.01 for 
contiguity and common language and p<0.1 for colonial links). Furthermore, the dummy 
variable controlling for the existence of a South-South EIA is not significant. This result is not 
very surprising since many South-South EIAs have not proved very effective in promoting 
trade between members (see e.g. Yang and Gupta, 2005, for Africa or Baldwin, 2008, for 
Asia). Lastly, we may note that the magnitude of coefficients on gravity variables estimated 
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for South-South trade are somewhat different from the ones previously estimated for North-
South trade. This upholds the sample divide in two parts (North-South and South-South 
trade).  
Columns (2) highlights that the signature by the importing and/or exporting Southern 
countries of an EIA with the North tends to reduce trade flows with other Southern partners 
(p<0.01 for the exporting and for the importing countries). This result is suggesting the 
presence of trade diversion effects. But whether such effect is of the traditional kind or 
conditional to the presence of standards harmonization is not controlled at that stage.  
Column (3) introduces controls for the harmonization of technical regulations in the 
North-South agreement signed. This estimation is our preferred one. Interestingly, results 
differ between the exporting and importing country. As such, the signature by the exporting 
country of an EIA involving the harmonization of its standards with the North has a negative 
and significant impact on its exchanges with other Southern countries, while the significant 
effect observed in the previous column on the variable ‘North-South EIA for the exporting 
country’ disappears. This result highlights the presence of the type of trade deflection we have 
been discussing in this paper. One explanation is as follows. The harmonization of standards 
has a cost and increases the price of the products. Such products become too expansive to be 
exported to some other Southern countries. The AVE is 19.7% under the assumption of a unit 
price elasticity. That is, a Southern country signing an EIA with a Northern partner involving 
the harmonization of technical regulations imposes a negative trade-deflection effect on its 
Southern partners equal to a 19.7% tariff, a very large effect. 
Results for the importing country are different. The signature of an EIA with the North 
reduces its imports from other Southern countries (pure trade diversion effect induced by a 
better access to the Northern market), but the harmonization of technical regulations has no 
significant impact.  
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Columns (4) and (5) investigate the impact on South-South trade of the signature by 
either one (exporting country vs. importing country) or both Southern partners of an EIA with 
the North. In cases where only one country has signed, previous conclusions remain observed. 
Interestingly, in cases where both Southern countries have signed EIAs with the North, results 
suggest the presence of traditional trade diversion effects only. The standards harmonization 
has no significant trade impact.  
The two last columns of table 3 report robustness checks’ results. These tests replicate 
the estimation of column (3), which is our preferred specification. Column (6) indicates that 
our results are not affected by the exclusion of agricultural products, which are less subject to 
TBTs than manufactured products, from our sample. 
 Lastly, the inclusion of a lag in the estimation (column 7) tends to reinforce our 
previous conclusions. The estimated coefficient on the variable capturing the harmonization 
on Northern standards in the exporting country is now stronger (-0.35 vs. -0.18) and 
significant at the one percent level. Therefore, standard harmonization in the exporting 
country has statistically significant lagged effects, which reinforce the trade diversion 
between Southern countries and the hub-and-spoke trade structure previously highlighted. 
Our results suggest that the trade deflection observed here may be at least partly a 
quality upgrading effect. As Southern exporters adopt Northern standards, they move up the 
quality ladder and redirect their exports towards markets with richer consumers. However, our 
results rule out such interpretation for the adoption of regional standards. In the case of 
international standards, the question remains open. However, the aggregated data used here 
does not allow us to further investigate this issue, as unit values (a proxy for quality) must be 
computed at the very detailed level of the product classification.  
Table 3 about here 
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6. Conclusion 
The purpose of this paper is to study the impact of North-South standards harmonization on 
the trade integration of Southern countries in the world economy. We distinguish the impact 
on North-South trade versus South-South trade. Our results suggest that North-South deep 
integration comprising harmonization of standards may be harmful for South-South trade. 
Furthermore, our findings also confirm Piermartini and Budetta (2009)’s intuition, i.e. 
harmonization on a regional basis may lock countries into some EIAs and reinforces the hub-
and-spoke trade structure. South-South trade is negatively impacted by harmonization, as 
South-North trade if harmonization is on regional standards. These results call for further 
research, especially at the sector level. One may also explore whether some differences in 
terms of trade impact are observable between developing and least developed countries. 
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Table 1: North-South EIAs and Trade
a
 Coverage 
 
 
   1990 1999 2006 
 Nb Trade 
coverage 
(%) 
Nb Trade 
coverage 
(%)  
Nb Trade 
coverage 
(%) 
EIAs 4 0.4 12 15.8 43 19.5 
Of which EIAs with harmonization of technical 
regulations 
0 0 5 14.2 21 15.7 
  Promotion of the use of regional standards only 0 0 2 2.1 6 3.8 
  Promotion of the use of international standards 
(alone or in addition to regional ones) 
0 0 2 12.1 12 11.8 
a: Northern imports from the South 
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Table 2: North-South Trade 
 
Specification Poisson maximum likelihood 
Dependent variable Bilateral imports of the Northern country from the Southern partner 
Trade flows All products Manufactured 
Products 
All products 
Years 1991-2006 (every 3 years) 1994-2006 
(every 3 
years)

 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Ln distance -0.59
a
 
(0.10) 
     
Common border 1.40
a
 
(0.34) 
     
Common language 0.41
a
 
(0.13) 
     
Past colonial links 0.11 
(0.19) 
     
North-South EIA 0.31
b
 
(0.13) 
-0.05 
(0.07) 
-0.17
c
 
(0.09) 
-0.15
c
 
(0.09) 
-0.16
c
 
(0.09) 
-0.22
a
 
(0.08) 
N-S EIA with standards 
harmonization 
  0.20
c
 
(0.12) 
   
N-S EIA with standards 
harmonization and promotion 
of regional standards 
   -0.26
b
 
(0.11) 
-0.34
a
 
(0.12) 
-0.23
b
 
(0.12) 
N-S EIA with standards 
harmonization and promotion 
of international standards 
   0.32
a
 
(0.11) 
0.34
a
 
(0.12) 
0.39
a
 
(0.13) 
Observations 18,304 18,045 18,045 18,045 18,045 15,266 
R²  0.881 0.995 0.995 0.996 0.996 0.996 
FE exporting country Yes      
FE importing country Yes      
FE year Yes      
FE exporting country × year  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
FE importing country × year  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
FE dyad  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Note: Constant and fixed effects not reported. Robust standard errors (importing country-exporting country 
clustered) in parentheses. a, b, c denote significance at the level of 1, 5, and 10%, respectively.  : The last column reports the total effect of EIA and harmonization by summing the values of the coefficients 
on the dummy for the concurrent year and on the lagged dummy. Standard errors are computed with the Delta 
method. 
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Table 3: South-South Trade 
 
Specification Poisson maximum likelihood 
Dependent variable Bilateral imports between Southern countries 
Trade flows All products Manufactured 
products 
All products 
Years  1991-2006 (every 3 years) 1994-2006 
(every 3 
years) 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Ln distance -0.78a 
(0.07) 
-0.78a 
(0.07) 
-0.78a 
(0.07) 
-0.78a 
(0.07) 
-0.78a 
(0.07) 
-0.78a 
(0.07) 
-0.79a 
(0.07) 
Common border 0.67a 
(0.14) 
0.66a 
(0.14) 
0.66a 
(0.14) 
0.68a 
(0.15) 
0.68a 
(0.15) 
0.73a 
(0.15) 
0.67a 
(0.14) 
Common language 0.42a 
(0.12) 
0.42a 
(0.12) 
0.42a 
(0.12) 
0.41a 
(0.12) 
0.41a 
(0.12) 
0.43a 
(0.12) 
0.42a 
(0.12) 
Past common colonizer 0.26c 
(0.14) 
0.25c 
(0.14) 
0.25c 
(0.14) 
0.26c 
(0.14) 
0.26c 
(0.14) 
0.25c 
(0.15) 
0.25c 
(0.14) 
South-South EIA 0.08 
(0.14) 
0.08 
(0.14) 
0.08 
(0.14) 
0.07 
(0.14) 
0.07 
(0.14) 
0.03 
(0.15) 
0.07 
(0.15) 
N-S EIA for the exporting country  -0.29a 
(0.07) 
-0.12 
(0.08) 
  -0.11 
(0.09) 
0.04 
(0.09) 
N-S EIA for the importing country  -0.22a 
(0.07) 
-0.26a 
(0.10) 
  -0.26b 
(0.10) 
-0.26a 
(0.10) 
N-S EIA for the exporting country only    -0.24a 
(0.07) 
-0.09 
(0.09) 
  
N-S EIA for the importing country only    -0.17b 
(0.07) 
-0.24b 
(0.11) 
  
N-S EIA for both countries    -0.59a 
(0.13) 
-0.42a 
(0.14) 
  
N-S EIA × standards harmonization 
with the North for the exporting country 
  
-0.18b 
(0.08) 
  
-0.20b 
(0.09) 
-0.35a 
(0.09) 
N-S EIA × standards harmonization 
with the North for the importing country 
  
0.05 
(0.10) 
  
0.03 
(0.10) 
0.05 
(0.10) 
N-S EIA × standards harmonization 
with the North for the exporter only 
    
-0.15c 
(0.09) 
  
N-S EIA × standards harmonization 
with the North for the importer only 
   
 0.07 
(0.10) 
  
N-S EIA × standards harmonization 
with the North for both countries 
   
 -0.18 
(0.16) 
  
Observations 114,702 114,702 114,702 114,702 114,702 114,702 98,700 
R² 0.877 0.877 0.877 0.878 0.878 0.880 0.885 
FE exporting country Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
FE importing country Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
FE year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Note: Constant and fixed effects not reported. Robust standard errors (importing country-exporting country 
clustered) in parentheses. a, b, c denote significance at the level of 1, 5, and 10%, respectively.  : The last column reports the total effect of EIA and harmonization by summing the values of the coefficients 
on the dummy for the concurrent year and on the lagged dummy. Standard errors are computed with the Delta 
method. 
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Figure 1: The Different Steps of Integration  
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Appendix A: List of Countries Included in the Sample 
 
Northern countries: 
Australia 
Austria 
Belgium-Luxembourg 
Canada 
Denmark 
Finland 
 
 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Iceland 
Ireland 
Italy 
 
 
Japan 
Netherlands 
New Zealand 
Norway 
Portugal 
Spain 
 
 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
United Kingdom 
United States 
Southern countries: 
Afghanistan 
Albania 
Algeria 
Angola 
Antigua and Barbuda 
Argentina 
Armenia 
Azerbaijan 
Bahamas 
Bahrain 
Bangladesh 
Barbados 
Belarus 
Belize 
Benin 
Bermuda 
Bhutan 
Bolivia 
Brazil 
Brunei Darussalam 
Burkina Faso 
Burundi 
Cambodia 
Cameroon 
Cape Verde 
Central African Republic 
Chad 
Chile 
China 
Colombia 
Comoros 
Congo 
Costa Rica 
Côte d’Ivoire 
Dem. Rep. of the Congo 
 
 
Djibouti 
Dominica 
Dominican Republic 
East Timor  
Ecuador 
Egypt 
El Salvador 
Equatorial Guinea 
Eritrea 
Ethiopia 
Fiji 
Gabon 
Gambia 
Georgia 
Ghana 
Grenada 
Guatemala 
Guinea 
Guinea-Bissau 
Guyana 
Haiti 
Honduras 
Hong Kong 
India 
Indonesia 
Iran 
Iraq 
Israel 
Jamaica 
Jordan 
Kazakhstan 
Kenya 
Kiribati 
Korea, Republic of 
Kuwait 
 
 
Kyrgyzstan 
Lao People’s Dem. Rep. 
Lebanon 
Liberia 
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya 
Madagascar 
Malawi 
Malaysia 
Maldives 
Mali 
Mauritania 
Mauritius 
Mexico 
Moldova, Rep. of 
Mongolia 
Morocco 
Mozambique 
Nepal 
Nicaragua 
Niger 
Nigeria 
Oman 
Pakistan 
Panama 
Papua New Guinea 
Paraguay 
Peru 
Philippines 
Qatar 
Russian Federation 
Rwanda 
Saint Kitts and Nevis 
Saint Lucia 
Saint Vincent and the 
Grenadines 
 
 
Samoa 
Sao Tome & Principe 
Saudi Arabia 
Senegal 
Seychelles 
Sierra Leone 
Singapore 
Solomon Islands 
Somalia 
South Africa 
Sri Lanka 
Sudan 
Suriname 
Syrian Arab Republic 
Tajikistan 
Tanzania, United 
Rep. of 
Thailand 
Togo 
Tonga 
Trinidad and Tobago 
Tunisia 
Turkey 
Turkmenistan 
Uganda 
Ukraine 
United Arab Emirates 
Uruguay 
Uzbekistan 
Vanuatu 
Venezuela 
Viet Nam 
Yemen 
Zambia 
Zimbabwe 
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Appendix B: List of North-South EIAs Included in the Study 
 
Australia – Papua New Guinea (PATCRA) 
Canada – Chile  
Canada – Costa Rica  
Canada – Israel 
Dominican Republic – Central America – 
United States Free Trade Agreement 
(CAFTA-DR) 
EC – Albania  
EC – Algeria  
EC – Chile  
EC – Egypt  
EC – Israel  
EC – Jordan  
EC – Lebanon  
EC – Mexico   
EC – Morocco  
EC – South Africa  
EC – Syria  
EC – Tunisia  
EC – Turkey  
EFTA – Chile  
EFTA – Israel 
EFTA – Jordan  
EFTA – Korea, Republic of  
EFTA – Mexico  
EFTA – Morocco  
EFTA – Singapore  
EFTA – Tunisia  
EFTA – Turkey  
Japan – Malaysia  
Japan – Mexico  
Japan – Singapore 
New Zealand – Singapore  
North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA) 
Singapore – Australia  
South Pacific Regional Trade and Economic 
Cooperation Agreement (SPARTECA) 
Thailand – Australia  
Thailand – New Zealand 
Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic 
Partnership 
US – Bahrain   
US – Chile  
US – Israel  
US – Jordan  
US – Morocco  
US – Singapore  
 
 
 
 
